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Introduction
The management of watershed resources and the
supply of water and other environmental services have
been subject to quite similar negative processes from
Middle East and North Africa Mediterranean countries
(Med-MENA) to South East Mediterranean countries
(Med-SE): increased erosion and soil productivity,
reduced supply of water services, loss of biodiversity
(Lacirignola and Hamdy, 1995).
Nevertheless, the scale of the processes and their
driving forces are quite different: in Med-MENA negative
environmental effects are mainly due to an intensive
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Abstract
Problems of unsustainable watershed use in the Mediterranean areas (overgrazing, forest degradation and clearing,
soil erosion, fires, etc.) often result from the reduced profitability of traditional land use systems, lack of clearly defined
property rights, insufficient enforcement of existing rules, and lack of adequate economic instruments. The paper tries
to analyze these problems from two complementary economic perspectives: the first one, based on a Cost-Benefit
Analysis approach, highlight the gap between public interest and local private profitability in ordinary watershed
management activities through three case studies in Tunisia. Once we have demonstrated that market mechanisms are
unable to allocate eff iciently watershed resources, we assume a more normative perspective focusing on the
implementation of voluntary instruments related to payments for environmental services. Due to the lack of experiences
in the Mediterranean basin, we discus the results of a comparison among six case-studies of payments for water provision
services in some developing countries underlying the role of transaction costs and social capital in the successful
implementation of these new economic instruments for the sustainable management of Mediterranean watershed resources.
Key words: cost-benefit analysis, payments for environmental services, Tunisia.
Resumen
Instrumentos económicos para la gestión sostenible de cuencas en el Mediterráneo
Los problemas del uso insostenible de cuencas en la zona mediterránea (sobrepastoreo, degradación del bosque, ero-
sión, incendios, etc.) son a menudo el resultado de la reducida rentabilidad de los sistemas tradicionales de uso del te-
rreno, la falta de derechos sobre la propiedad claramente definidos, la aplicación insuficiente de reglas existentes, y de
la falta de instrumentos económicos adecuados. El artículo trata de analizar estos problemas desde dos perspectivas eco-
nómicas complementarias: la primera, basada en un enfoque del análisis coste-beneficio, destaca el vacío entre el inte-
rés público y la rentabilidad privada local en actividades ordinarias de gestión de las cuencas en tres casos de estudio en
Túnez. Una vez que hemos demostrado que esos mecanismos de mercado no pueden asignar eficientemente los recur-
sos de la cuenca, asumimos una perspectiva más normativa que se centra en la implementación de instrumentos volun-
tarios relacionados con el pago por servicios ambientales. Debido a la falta de experiencias en la cuenca mediterránea,
discutimos los resultados de una comparación entre seis casos de estudio de pago por servicios de provisión de agua en
algunos países en desarrollo resaltando el papel de los costes de transacción y el capital social en la implementación exi-
tosa de estos nuevos instrumentos económicos para la gestión sostenible de los recursos de las cuencas Mediterráneas.
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use of natural resources: water scarcity, soil erosion, po-
tential reduction of forage, loss of biodiversity and forest
degradation. Due to the loss of natural forest cover in
Med-MENA, less than 1% of land area is actually cove-
red by natural forest (Perman et al., 2003). Two sets of
reasons could explain this state of degradation: firstly,
the lack of clearly defined property rights, insufficient
enforcement of existing rules on fuelwood harvesting
and on use of grazing resources. The second reason is
the short-sightedness and low interest by local popula-
tion and farmers to the sustainable use and long-term
effects of forest cover. In fact, farmers and local forest
users have an objective to maximize their current
commercial incomes from an the present intensive use
of natural resources (subsistence economy), and disregard
the loss in future profitability of the forests, which will
affect their income directly.
In Med-SE negative environmental effects are mainly
due to farm land and forest land extensivation and
abandonment in inner marginal rural areas, and to land
development in costal areas, with locally an increased
pressure on forests by tourism, recreation and urban
development. This twofold process has caused an in-
crease of forest f ires in the last years, with negative
externalities such as soil erosion, water scarcity, loss
of biodiversity and cultural landscapes.
Watershed management activities are associated to
both, short term and long term, private and public (social)
costs and benefits (OECD, 1985). Moreover cost and
benef its are perceived locally (i.e. on-site effects)
or/and by the population living outside the area, down-
stream the watershed (i.e. off-site effects).
By comparison between the financial and economic
analysis of watershed economic activities, instruments
could be designed that would make private owners cope
with society’s desired action. Furthermore, the problems
related to institutional arrangements to implement the
«beneficiary pays» principle should be considered.
This paper attempts to analyze these problems and
to discuss some relevant features of payments for water-
shed services to induce sustainable management of Me-
diterranean forests. More specifically, the paper is orga-
nized into two main parts: in the f irst we highlight,
with a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) approach, the gap
between public interest and local private profitability
in ordinary watershed management activities through
three case studies in Tunisia. Once we have demonstrated
that market mechanisms are unable to allocate efficiently
watershed resources, we assume a more normative
perspective focusing on the implementation of economic
instruments related to payments for water provision
services.
Private and public profitability 
in Mediterranean watershed
management: three case studies
Forest resources in Tunisia, as in all other Medi-
terranean countries, play a key-role in watershed pro-
tection and in providing environmental services to the
local inhabitants and to the off-site population. In
Tunisia forestland is characterized by a lack of clearly
defined property rights: in theory the State is the owner
of the land, but local households actually have free access
to forest resources for livestock grazing, firewood har-
vesting of some Non Wood Forest Products (NWFP).
Thus, forest management is guided by the need of ma-
ximizing the current commercial income for local users.
The costs of soil and water conservation practices to
local users are much higher compared to additional land
users’ income. As a consequence, forests are characte-
rized by a steady process of degradation with negative
impacts on a large set of off-site services.
A first case study was conducted to compare, using
a Cost-Benefit Analysis, the results of sustainable natu-
ral regeneration and unsustainable management of a
cork oak woodland for different economic actors
(Daly-Hassen et al., 2009). The second and third case
studies are similar in the methodological approach
consisting in a step-wise CBA of two watershed protec-
tion investments where costs and benefits are compared
with reference to enlarged sets of potential beneficiaries.
In adopting a CBA approach to watershed conser-
vation investments we refer to the basic distinction
between financial and economic analysis of investments,
as codified by several manuals (e.g. for the forest in-
vestments: Gregersen and Contreras, 1979, 1992; OECD,
1986; Ray, 1990; Watt, 1993), some of them specifi-
cally related to watershed management investments
(Gregersen et al., 1987; OECD, 1985). Unfortunately
the definition of economic analysis remains far from
clear both in the literature and even more in empirical
applications. Little progress has been made on the
standard conceptions of the early 1970s according to
which the essence of CBA was «adjustment» of receipts
and expenditure to find out the «welfare gain» of in-
vestments and changes affecting society (Little and
Mirrlees, 1974, p. 19). Indeed the state of art is such
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that a reasonable codif ication of «adjustment» has
been achieved only in terms of treatment of taxes,
transfers and market distortions, while the «welfare gain»
due to «off-site» and «non-market» costs and benefits
and to distributional effects remains a vague concept.
As stressed by Johansson (1993, p. 21) «the problem
in using social welfare when assessing projects is that
the social welfare function cannot be measured».
Ain Snoussi cork oak forest management 
case study
A financial and an economic analysis were conduc-
ted taking into consideration two management scenarios
for the Ain Snoussi cork oak woodland: under the first
one, cork oaks naturally regenerate at infinite horizon
(the «sustainable scenario»), whereas in the second one
the cork oak forest is over-used until the aged trees gra-
dually disappear and are replaced by shrub land (the «un-
sustainable» or «business as usual scenario»). Expen-
ditures and revenues of the entire production cycle of
cork oak forests under the two management scenarios
were valued with reference to two groups of economic
actors: the local households and the Government
representing the community interests.
Results of the financial analysis show that cork oak
depletion (the «Business as usual scenario») is the
most profitable alternative for the local households
(more detailed information on data collection and
assumptions are reported in Campos et al., 2007; Daly
et al., 2009). At a real discount rate of 2%, financial
Net Present Values (NPV) in the «sustainable scenario»
is more profitable for the Government (NPV = 4,756 €
ha–1; Fig. 1), but much less advantageous for the local
households (NPV = 1,492 € ha–1). Under the current
market, renewing a cork oak stand results in a capital
loss compared to the alternative of letting those stands
deplete. This comparison stresses the conflict between
sustainability and a private income of local forest users.
Thus, there is a need of compensation for income losses
suffered by families under sustainable management
since they seem unable to accept income losses in orden
to avoid cork oak depletion, or to pay for the losses
incurred. Compensation should cover at minimum the
difference between the two situations, and that can be
covered by the surplus gained by the Government. Even
if cork oak sustainable management is not economically
profitable for private owners, we argue that the situa-
tion could differ when conservation values, such as
reducing soil erosion, decreasing dam siltation, carbon
sequestration and biodiversity conservation are included.
The estimation of environment benefits provided by
the cork forests and the damages costs resulting from
the overuse caused by local populations were attempted
in a second study (Daly-Hassen et al., 2007). The ob-
jectives of this study were to estimate both the private
and social economic values associated with the Tunisia’s
cork oak forests and their distribution among the diffe-
rent stakeholders.
Results showed that private benefits (benefits de-
rived from private goods such as cork, fuelwood, grazed
forage, etc.), offer an incomplete view of the social
benefits. In fact, extenal benefits (20 € ha–1) make up
20% of all the social benef its (98 € ha–1). Private
benefits amounted to 77.9 € ha–1, split into 38.1 € ha–1
for forest administration and 39.8 € ha–1 for local
population. However, the current use induces a costs
of damages due degradation and overuse supported by
all the stakeholders: the reduced forage potential
(7.7 € ha–1), which is solely suffered by the local users,
the loss of current and future returns especially from
cork (7.4 € ha–1) born by the government, and the loss
of carbon sequestration and increased erosion (5.6 €
ha–1) born by the whole society and global community
(Fig. 2). The studied region’s excessive human pressure
and its high poverty levels explain the widespread overuse
of common forest resources pool and resulting private
and environmental costs.
A sustainable use could enhance the households’ net
benefits and reduce degradation costs from a private
and social perspective. Hence, there is a need for me-
chanisms for forage allocation and incentives in order
to attain a greater sustainable management and rationa-
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Figure 1. Comparison of f inancial Net Present Values in 
the «sustainable» and «business as usual» scenarios for the 
local households and for the Government (€ ha–1; discount 
rate: 2%).
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lized local usage. The public owner and society will
be better off due to avoided higher costs of degradation
from current practice, and farmers will gain more profit
from sustainable use (Fig. 3).
Bou Hertna and Marguellil watershed
investment case studies
In the case studies carried out for analyzing the inte-
grated watershed investment projects in Bou Hertma
and Marguellil, a CBA exercise has been organized in
four steps (detailed information on data and methods
are presented in Cesaro et al., 1998):
(i) Financial Analysis (FA) where monetary flows
of expenditures and revenues alone, were taken into
account. Prices were those observed in the market.
(ii) Conventional Economic Analysis (CEA) where
market prices of costs and benefits items were adjusted
by means of conversion factors to reflect the true value
of resources, therefore eliminating market failures
(monopolies, etc.) and transfer payments (taxes, etc.).
(iii) Extended Economic Analysis II (EEA) where
on-site and off-site effects, internal and external to the
market (intangibles, public goods, etc.) enter the CBA.
Economic valuation techniques used for this purpose
were based on indirect market effects, such as the pro-
ductivity change down the watershed; non-market values
have been estimated using consumer surplus measures,
i.e. with methods such as Travel Cost and Contingent
Valuation.
(iv) Socio-Economic Analysis (SEA) where, first,
the previous costs and benefits were assigned to the
various social groups and, second, weighted according
to «utilities». Undoubtedly, this is the most critical and
controversial step both from the theoretical and practi-
cal point of view. Far from representing a specific step
(or extension) of CBA, SEA is rather a way of attempting
a «social» analysis of the projects’ gains and losses
that could be done at each step of the CBA.
Crossing impacts effects with their f inancial/eco-
nomic consequences,Table 1 shows how physical and
economic aspects interact giving rise to the various
possible steps of the CBA procedure.
The framework proposed therefore attempts to
organise the CBA procedure in such a way that analysts
and decision-makers can be constantly informed and
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Figure 3. Comparison of private benefits and degradation costs
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On site (for the residents) * * * *
Off site (external to the watershed) — — * *
Market * * * *
Non market — — * *
Redistribution among stakeholders — — — *







Carbon emissions Loss of cork and other private 
benefits
Erosion Forage loss
Private benefits for local population Degradation costs
aware of the type of impacts, effects and valuation tech-
niques and the increasing complexity and controversy
arising as they move from financial to economic latu
sensu and social analysis modules. In this way the CBA
objective function is gradually extended to include
measure of social welfare gain towards an assessment
of the Total Economic Value of watershed resources,
products and services.
As shown by Table 2, the Bou Hertma investment
included ten components, mainly concerned with fo-
restry and rangeland improvements, each having an
investment period of 2-3 years. The area on which the
actions were carried out covers 4,532 ha, i.e. about
13.5% of the total surface of the watershed. The cost
investment amounts to around US$ 26.5 million.
The Marguellil watershed covers about 154,000 ha,
being closed in the lower part by a dam creating a
reservoir of about 78 millions m3. Sedimentation of
the reservoirs is one of the most relevant problems.
Erosive processes, similarly to many other parts of Tu-
nisia and of the Mediterranean basin, are clearly evident,
affecting 75% of the watershed agricultural land which
must be therefore carefully protected, and this explains
why most of the actions consist of soil and water
conservation (Table 3). The intervention area covered
40,000 ha of highly erosive soil, and represented about
25% of the total watershed area.
Identification, quantification and monetary valuation
of the various effects are outlined in Table 4, where this
process is closely linked to the analyst/decision maker’s
objective function, and therefore to the CBA steps.
On each step of analysis the NPV and the Internal
Rate of Return (IRR) have been calculated. Table 5 shows
how passing from financial (FA) to economic (CEA,
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Table 2. Bou Hertma watershed: components and relative quantities and investment values
Components
Area Investment costs Total costs
(ha) (€ ha–1) (1,000 €)
Pine plantation for wood production 434 2,780 1,207
Plantations with mixed sp. for soil protection 190 1,642 323
Cork oak regeneration 837 290 244
Grazing land amelioration 1,017 2,447 2,488
Meadow management 110 1,559 172
Management of existing forests 685 424 290
Soil stabilization 280 660 185
Pine forests thinning 939 192 180
Forest roads construction 44* 18,000* 792
NWFPs 2,461
Total 0 5,868
* Data related to 1 km.
Table 3. Marguellil watershed: components and relative quantities and investment values
Components
Area Investment costs Total costs
(ha) (€ ha–1) (1,000 €)
Terracing 7,500  448 3,356
Stone lives Cordons  4,000 600 2,400
Tree basins Couvettes 3,000 168 504
Fruit trees plantations 2,960 936 2,771
Forage trees plantations 6,000 948 4,824
Range improvement 10,000 235 8,040
Protective plantations 6,000  804 4,824
Small reservoirs 4* 180,000 720
Landslide fixation 172,000** 21.6 3,715
River management 70,000** 75.6 5,292
Total 36,446
* Data are related to one reservoir. ** Data are related to cubic meters.
EEA) and social CBA (SEA), the IRR indicators for
the whole project increase from 9.2% to 21.4%. FA
and CEA show results comparable to those of similar
investments in other Mediterranean countries. EEA
analysis improves the IRR to over 19%. Taking account
of welfare per income groups, SEA increases the IRR
to 23%. The NPV also shows similar trends. One can
therefore argue, rather soundly, that accounting for off-
site, non market and social costs and benefits (i.e. EEA
and SEA) certainly shows a remarkable additional
welfare gain of the watershed projects and an overall
high profitability.
How to fill the gap between private
profitability and public utility: the
role of payments for watershed services
Usually, public intervention to promote watershed
conservation is based on the idea of integrated manage-
ment projects with a combination of participatory
approaches, direct public investments in infrastructures,
subsidies for adopting conservation measures, enfor-
cements of some limitations in land use, and income
creation investments (Pswarayi-Riddihough, 2002).
Experiences gained in integrated watershed conservation
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Table 4. Valuation approaches implemented in the CBA of Bou Hertma and Marguellil watersheds
CBA steps Effects Valuation Objective functions





— Agricultural and forest pro-
ducts (wood and non-wood) 
— Agricultural and forest pro-
ducts (wood and non-wood)
— Erosion
— Water availability (reduced sil-
tation)
— Flooding occurrence
— Improved rural access due to
road building*
— Development of hunting*
— Damages from flooding**
— Tourism & outdoor recreation*
— Climate stabilization* 
— Water table recharge**
— Distribution 
Market prices of inputs and outputs
Use of specif ic conversion factors to adjust
market prices
Modified Universal Soil Loss Equation used
in a Geographical Information System in order
to forecast erosion, flooding and consequent
agricultural production levels 
Lower costs of access to market and social ser-
vices
Sale of shooting permits
Damages to agriculture, infrastructures and
houses 
Number of visits* (average unit value-Benefit
transfer approach)
Carbon fixation* (average unit value-Benefit
transfer approach)
Water supply for irrigation and hence greater
agricultural production
Three social groups: natives living in the ac-
tion's area (weight: 1.5), farmers in the wa-













Table 5. Main results of CBA application
Watershed NPV (1,000 $S) IRR
FA Bou Hertma 1,186,039 12.7%
Marguellil –1,435,617 9.2%
Total –249,578 9.9%
CEA Bou Hertma 4,623,708 19.9%
Marguellil 5,784,849 13.9%
Total 10,408,557 15.4%
EEA Bou Hertma 6,231,660 23.3%
Marguellil 10,534,898 17.6%
Total 16,776,558 19.1%
SEA Bou Hertma 9,325,018 28.0%
Marguellil 22,474,503 21.6%
Total 31,799,521 23.1%
projects developed in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia
show the effectiveness of subsidies for intensive live-
stock breeding, introducing new agro-forestry systems,
converting croplands to pastoral lands, with compen-
sations to local population for prohibiting access to
new plantations and limiting the use of degraded pas-
toral land.
Besides these traditional instruments, a growing
interest is characterizing the introduction of market-
based payments by off-site beneficiaries for environ-
mental services associated to watershed conservation
projects, namely: carbon sequestration, biodiver-
sity protection and water provision. In the Me-
diterranean region there are positive examples of
carbon sequestration and biodiversity protection
payment systems1, while for water provision there is
no evidence of well established and fully operational
initiatives. This is quite an un-explicable development,
being water provision a key service: both tap and
irrigation water represent a strategic development
factor for the region.
Looking at the experiences gained in other regions
(Perrot-Maître and Davis, 2001) different types of market-
based payments for water provision services can be
implemented based on voluntary contractual arran-
gements, i.e. on direct negotiations between water
users and landowners, with direct payments for mana-
gement practices that protect water quality or the trade
of «credits» between companies and landowners for
respecting the requirements on water use or pollution
limits. In the following pages, after summarizing the
main theoretical issues under discussion, we try to
understand the underling causes of successful systems
of payments for water provision services looking at the
experiences in six case-studies.
General issues related to the establishment 
of payments systems for watershed services
It is generally accepted that land use decisions can
affect the provision of watershed environmental services,
although there is sometimes disagreement about the
extent and nature of the effects (Calder, 2000; Donovan,
2007). However, managing land and water interactions
is difficult because of the public good characteristic
of watershed services: usually costs of watershed inter-
ventions are supported by private owners in upstream
areas, while benefits for water capacity (i.e. irrigation
and drinkable water) profit the farmers and the popu-
lation in downstream areas. However, there is also a
problem of measurability of land use effects at different
scales: the impacts of land uses on the flow and stocks
of water, sediments, nutrients, organic matter and pa-
thogens are not always easily measurable, specially for
large scale basins (FAO, 2000). Water users have little
incentive to pay for improved watershed services provi-
sion if they cannot exclude non-payers from enjoying
these benefits (Pagiola et al., 2002). Indeed, changes
on the part of one upstream land owner or user aimed
at improving a habitat or reducing erosion in a water-
shed are unlikely to be sufficient to provide these envi-
ronmental services, unless the owner or user controls
a large proportion of the land and water resources for
the services provision. This means that considering
change at a landscape level is as important as it is at the
scale of the individual owner or user. It also means that
the effectiveness of any given changes may depend
critically on coordinating the actions of a number of
producers (FAO, 2007) and this has lead to high tran-
saction costs of establishing payment for watershed ser-
vices (PWS) (Pagiola et al., 2005). This situation is exa-
cerbated by the fact that most PWS involve a large number
of smallholder farmers.
The implications of excessive transaction costs are
that markets are thin or fail if prohibitivelyhigh costs
prevent exchange. This link between transaction costs
and the emergence of institutions has long been recog-
nized in the theory of institutional economics (Coase,
1937; North, 1990; Williamson, 1981). Two major cate-
gories of transaction costs can pose major obstacles to
functional markets for environmental services: nego-
tiation costs and enforcement costs. Negotiation costs
include the time, social and financial costs of organizing
buyers and sellers into operating units, as well as the
costs of establishing contact, preparing the necessary
documentation, and negotiation between buyers and
sellers. Enforcement costs include the costs of moni-
toring and enforcement of contracts between buyers
and sellers, and among groups of buyers and sellers,
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1 See some projects in Morocco and Tunisia financed by the Global Environmental Facility for wild fauna and flora protection;
seven afforestation and reforestation projects under the Clean Development Mechanism are recently registered in the Med-MENA
region and project ideas under the Global Forest Carbon Mechanism are also developed in some Med-MENA countries for emissions
reductions through reduced deforestation and forest degradation investments.
the costs of internal and external auditing and, when
needed, of certification (Swallow et al., 2005).
In circumstance of excessive transaction costs infor-
mal and formal institutions are necessary for individual
and collective pursuits and influence economic and en-
vironmental outcomes. Institutions matter because they
contribute to solve problems of coordination of agents’
plans; help to promote cooperative behaviour and overco-
me opportunism; make agents internalize externalities,
reduce uncertainty and support the formation of social
capital and of a historical experience of collective action
which, in turn, positively affect the likelihood to credi-
bly commit in cooperative strategies (Gagliardi, 2008).
Another area where institutions could play a great
role is in property rights assignment and enforcement.
Well-def ined land and resource tenure are at the
foundation of payment schemes (Pagiola et al., 2002).
Tenure issues need to be taken into account for property
rights to effectively support a payment scheme for
watershed services. Hence, property rights must provide
for more than the regulation of land ownership and
include the natural resources that the land provides.
Ensuring that property rights are clearly designated,
whether through formal or customary law, is essential
if payment schemes are to result in the anticipated
incentives for watershed management. Property rights
are found to be most valuable, and create the strongest
incentives for resource management, when they are
secure. Effective registration and administration of
tenure rights is an instrument for clarifying rights
among stakeholders. Moreover, environmental service
mechanisms that link private purchasers with private
or collective suppliers of those services are usually
supported by an explicit contract that increases the
accountability of the suppliers to the performance of
agreed-upon actions. Contracts usually require that the
environmental service providers have clear and secure
rights to perform the agreed-upon actions on that land,
like the standards approved by the Climate, Commu-
nity and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA, 2004). Farmers
operating on plots without secure tenure tend to
practice extractive short-duration agriculture, while
farmers operating on plots with secure private title tend
to practice complex multi-strata agroforestry systems.
Even if laws are passed to define property rights over
environmental services, the rights will not be effective
property rights unless they are accompanied by effe-
ctive enforcement. Enforcement can come from a range
of international, state, local or customary institutions
(Swallow et al., 2005).
Recently the role of social capital in the governance
of collective resources such as natural resources has
become a topic of widespread interest especially in de-
velopment policy debates. It is increasingly agreed that
customary institutions as a form of social capital matter
in the management of collective resources as they pro-
vide structure and foster trust and norms of reciprocity
for cooperation and coordinated actions. These insti-
tutions are the local equivalents of the rule of law as
they are deeply tied to local notions of identity and social
norms of cooperation. Social capital describes cir-
cumstances in which individuals can use membership
in groups and networks to secure benefits. It is an attri-
bute of an individual in a social context. One can
acquire social capital through purposeful actions and
can transform social capital into conventional economic
gains. The ability to do so, however, depends on the
nature of the social obligations, connections, and
networks available (Sobel, 2002). The endowment of
community social capital, which is often defined as
trust, norms and networks facilitating cooperation and
collective action (Putnam, 1993), is the prime aspect
that plays a vital role in determining success or failure
of management of collective actions (Dahal, 2008).
Payments for watershed services: lessons
from six case studies
To analyze the role of property rights, social capital,
transaction costs, and initiatives of the public sector
institutions in PWS schemes, six case studies have
been selected. The selection of the schemes was deli-
berately done to be two schemes from each Asia and
South America. The schemes were chosen from the
watershed market website (www.watershedmarkets.org)
which comprises a description of more than fifty PWS
schemes mainly in developing countries. Available
published and un-published literature and direct
interviews with the schemes project managers and FAO
experts have been the main sources of information. In
Box 1 a brief general description of each selected scheme
is reported, while Table 6 presents a summary of the
key factors to illustrate the six PWS schemes consi-
dered in the paper.
A key determinant in the successful establishment
of PWS schemes considered in this study has been the
presence of traditional institutions. For example, in
Sumberjaya, two informal institutions, gotong-royong
(labor sharing on common property) and arisan (capital
sharing among community members) were instrumental
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in facilitating the adoption of local PWS schemes. This
was also the case in Maasin watershed scheme where,
because of the existing social capital among the local
people, their participation in the project was very high.
These informal institutions help increase local partici-
pation and adoption of conservation measures as well
as reduce the costs of transactions. Also the Tanzania
case study confirms that social relationships and net-
works, able to share resources and risks and to enhance
cooperative attitudes among local actors, facilitate the
adoption of PWS schemes.
But bonding of social capital alone is not adequate
for the sustainable functioning of PWS schemes. Rather
a lot has to be done in bridging social capital since in
most cases the interest of upland and lowland commu-
nities is conflicting. Recognizing this fact, it was
outlined that bridging social capital is the next challen-
ge of the Maasin watershed scheme. The Heredia
Public Service Enterprise scheme is ahead of the other
schemes in this regard as a result of which the socio-
economic well being of both buyers and sellers is in
much better condition. The role of education and envi-
ronmental campaign was found to be important in this
regard. In almost all the schemes there has been some
practice of awareness creation and thereby strengthe-
ning the social capital in the respective places. However
to make this environmental education programmes
more effective, it is necessary to attach this campaigns
with direct benefits to the learner in order to provide
motivation to change.
Enabling policy environment appeared to be crucial
for both tenure security and mobilizing resources for
PWS schemes. The case studies show that major support
for PWS usually come from dynamic and innovative
leaders at both local and national levels who can act
as champions for innovative approaches. For example,
political willingness and support from the local go-
vernment was a success factor in the Maasin watershed
in the Philippines where the provincial governor and
municipal mayor were champions of PWS, motivating
local stakeholders and mobilizing finance for conser-
vation efforts. This support was not only crucial to con-
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Box 1. The six case studies
Water Conservation Fund in Quito (Ecuador)
The experience of this trust fund has been considered of
high interest for its institutional set up to collect funds from
the buyers of watershed services. Moreover the scheme is
known for the involvement of a number of institutions
including bi-lateral donors. Relatively good informative
materials are also available for this scheme (Echavarria,
2002; Espinosa, 2005).
Heredia Public Service Enterprise scheme (Costa Rica)
Costa Rica being one of the pioneer countries in
developing payments for environmental schemes and known
for its success in this regard, it was worth considering one
scheme related to watershed conservation. This PWS scheme
is mainly concerned with water quality and the need for
regulating its flow. Moreover, the scheme has been developed
for serving the city of Heredia, a case quite similar to that
potentially found in many Mediterranean costal cities. Most
of the relatively abundant literatures pertaining to this
scheme is in Spanish (Echavarria, 2002; Redondo-Brenes
and Welsh, 2006).
Sumberjaya scheme (Indonesia)
This is an interesting and unique experience among the
PWS schemes so far. The farmers in this scheme are
rewarded tenure rights for f ive years, with possibility of
extension for 25 years in return for protecting the remaining
forests in the area and as well as to exercise agroforestry
practices in their coffee farms. In addition, relatively good
published information is available regarding its institutional
dimension (Arifin, 2005).
Maasin Watershed Reserve Forest scheme, Iloilo province,
Panay Island (Philippines)
This scheme involves a number of institutions including
different public sector agencies, NGOs, and others.
Moreover the scheme is specifically dealing with water flow
regulation and literature pertaining the scheme is relatively
abundant and of good quality (Francisco and Salas, 2004).
Working for Wetland programme (South Africa)
The scheme is supporting the rehabilitation of wetlands
based on biophysical characteristics of catchments areas
with less regard paid to the land ownership. Direct payments
for rehabilitation work are made on the basis of the selection
of the best contractor bid. No much information is available
on this as well as five other South African PWS initiatives
that are in the planning stages (King et al., 2005).
Equitable Payment for Watershed Services scheme,
Uluguru Mountains (Tanzania)
The scheme is one of the very few PWS implemented in
Africa, but still in a pilot phase. The watershed has a crucial
role in regulating the Ruvu river flow, the principal source
of water for the city of Dar Es Salaam. Information from
literature is relatively good, thanks also to the involvement
of some international NGOs in the project (Lopa, 2009;
CARE/WWF, 2007).
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Table 6. Summary of the major characteristics of the PWS schemes considered
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solidate local efforts towards PWS, but also instru-
mental in designing acceptable watershed protection
fees to be paid by watershed service beneficiaries in
the area. In addition to the role of governments as buyers
of environmental services, like in the South Africa case
study, participation in PWS could be enhanced through
enabling policy support, and financial and technical
assistance. The role of national governments will be
more relevant when it leads to create the necessary
legal framework for PWS schemes, and if sufficient
governmental institutions are present, property rights
can be clearly assigned and enforced as in the case of
Costa Rica and South Africa schemes. Equally important
is cooperation between other relevant institutions
towards the shared objectives of enhancing environ-
mental service markets and conservation, as in the
Tanzanian Equitable Payment for Watershed Services
scheme. Since partnerships between private and civil
society institutions are relatively uncommon, a more
coordinated and integrated approach helps efforts toward
addressing poverty-related environmental degradation
and comprehensive natural resource management.
However the public sectors were not the ultimate
source of success for these schemes and it was not
without limitations. Water utilities that belong to the
public sector depend on political issues, which can
easily change with different administrations threatening
the long term sustainability of the initiatives. In the
Water Conservation Fund in Quito for example on the
past eight years, the city leadership had changed three
times which required investing in lobbying the new
mayor to continue honouring this contract. Problems
pertaining the amount and duration of disbursement
of funds were also observed in some of the schemes.
The role of intermediary organizations appeared to
be vital to link service producers and buyers as well as
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Table 6 (cont.). Summary of the major characteristics of the PWS schemes considered
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reducing the costs of transaction. The findings from
most of the schemes shows that awareness of environ-
mental services and even willingness to pay for envi-
ronmental services rose through the concerted efforts
of environmental Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs). These organizations can mobilize and assist
communities in crafting rules and regulations at the
local level. The role of NGOs was apparent in many
cases, especially in raising awareness among stake-
holders. In the Maasin watershed in the Philippines,
NGOs helped in community mobilization, organization
build up, data collection, conflict resolution, and
execution of environmental activities compatible with
the PWS scheme in the watershed. The same situation
was observed in the Water Conservation Fund and the
Sumberjaya case study. This significant involvement
of NGOs in most of the schemes considered is an im-
portant indicator of institutional shift away from the
public sector which resulted in an increasing role for
NGOs in providing public goods. In practice the inter-
national lenders have focused more on helping the
private sector in order to avoid government corruption
and misuse of development aid as well as refusal to
accommodate donor needs.
The available literature pinpoint the importance of
secured tenure rights for the successful functioning of
PWS schemes as they require for land use changes con-
tractual agreements with long term commitments. But
the result of the cases examined is a mixed one. While
the Heredia Public Service Enterprise scheme has be-
nefited a lot from the secured land tenure of farmers,
in the other schemes the link is the other way round in
that the PWS schemes help strengthen land rights. In
the Sumberjaya scheme, for example, farmers were
allowed to obtain land tenure in return for protecting
the remaining forest and planting trees in their coffee
farms for a trial period of 5 years with the possibility
of extension for 25 years. On the other hand, PWS have
also threatened the property rights of poor and margi-
nalised populations. This was the case in the Water
Conservation Fund in Quito where the original land-
owners were never compensated for their loss of land
title needs.
In the Tanzanian case study the contractual frame-
work under which soil conservation practices are
adopted involves the aggregation of land-owners and
disbursement of in-kind payments by village authori-
ties, to avoid the higher costs of contracting individual
land-owners. Also, since the land is public, farmers do
not have land entitlements, while the village authorities
manage the land on behalf of central government and
are entitled to enter into such contracts. A participatory
approach is adopted in order to ensure the sustaina-
bility of the PWS programme. An Intermediary Group
has been created involving the members from key sectors
with a stake in forestry and water resources, particu-
larly the Ministry of Water and the Wami-Ruvu Basin
Water Office, local communities, private companies
as well as the civil society organizations. This body will
oversee the programme implementation, mobilize far-
mers, identify the institutions devoted to collect and distri-
bute the payments to farmers, and lead the scaling up and
replication of the scheme into other watersheds across
Tanzania. These experiences shows that the implemen-
tation of PWS schemes can contribute to the creation
of new property rights: PWS arrangements assumes
that land users have the right to use the land as they want
and if others do not like the negative externalities deri-
ving from the on-going practices, they must pay the land
user to change his or her land management systems.
Consistent with the theory which states that transac-
tion costs are highest when there are multiple, small
scale service providers and users, the transaction costs
for Heredia Public Service Enterprise scheme were
almost zero as it involves few large holder farmers while
the situation in the Sumberjaya scheme was the contrary.
The transaction costs in Sumberjaya were more than
half of their average annual income of rural households
in the province. In such circumstances institutional
innovations are very important to reduce these costs
but also to make the PWS schemes pro-poor as the
transaction costs will be more severe for the poor in
particular. Positive transaction costs determine the
pattern and degree of ownership and thereby wealth
distribution and as a result equitable distribution of
resource allocation. Clearly assigning property rights
is one area of institutional innovation to reduce transac-
tion costs when they are high. Other areas where insti-
tutional innovations are needed include building social
capital and the correct functioning of intermediaries.
Without intermediaries, the potential of PWS at many
of these sites and in developing countries in general
would be probably not realized, at least in the short-run.
Discussion
With the three cases studies in Tunisia presented in
this paper it was clearly stated that there is a conflict
among sustainable use of forests and private income
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demanding some kind of compensation for those farmers
adopting sustainable land use practices. In this regard
payments for environmental services in general and
PWS could be of great importance in solving this conflict.
However, these payments do not need to be necessarily
in cash. It is important to use all forms of incentives
possible to encourage sustainable management and use
of forests. For example, in Ain Snoussi, forest resources
control is shared by the Tunisian State and local inha-
bitants. The State property rights are therefore incom-
plete. Available literature emphasizes that in such cases
where there is no secure property rights over an asset
and/or a resource, farmers tend to maximize their short
term benefits which in turn results in unsustainable
use of natural resources. The case of Ain Snoussi forests
could be a good example for such an argument where
the farmers are mainly interested in maximizing current
commercial income. This has again resulted in the
steady degradation of forests that is accompanied by
negative impacts on off-site beneficiaries of environ-
mental services. In this regard sustainable use of the
forest could be encouraged by, for example, assigning
conditional incentives for those who applied sustai-
nable practices. The experience of the Sumberjaya
scheme in Indonesia could be a good lesson.
Insufficient enforcement of existing rules was also
outlined to be another factor that contributed for the
misuse of forests in Tunisia. However it is well recog-
nised that without suff icient enforcement, laws by
themselves cannot yield efficient outcomes. From the
Maasin watershed scheme of Phillipines it can be learnt
that enforcement of laws and regulations for conserva-
tion should be accompanied by a concerted activity of
mobilizing both the on-site and off-site forest dwellers.
Daly-Hassen et al. (2009) have stated that the local
population is in fact little concerned with forest conser-
vation or management decisions. In recent decades,
the forest administration has focused on greater invol-
vement of local inhabitants in forest development
plans. This new approach began with the creation of
forest associations. These associations can serve for
both building and bridging social capital among the
forest dwellers and thus ease understanding among on-
site and off-site beneficiaries. They can be especially
helpful to implement local development plans for
improving crop lands and scrublands productivities
and introducing alternative activities such as milk and
cheese production for greater income generation.
However, these incentives should be conditional with
the control of forest resources allocation such as distance
from markets, access conditions, season of use, livestock
species, etc. and the promotion of the sustainable ma-
nagement. From the analysis of the experiences of the
PWS presented in this paper, it was observed that NGOs
were behind the success story of almost all of the
schemes considered. In Tunisia NGOs are already well
introduced and this is a positive factor for PWS deve-
lopment. The NGOs could be even instrumental in
generating donor funding as they are in a better posi-
tion to attract more funds than the inefficient State bu-
reaucrats. It is also important to recognize the role of
such measures in reducing transaction costs for future
implementation of similar projects.
Conclusions
Accounting for off-site, non market and social costs
and benefits of Mediterranean watershed protection
projects shows a remarkable high profitability. Intro-
ducing systems of payments for the environmental ser-
vices can cover the gap existing between local land
users’ profitability and public gain deriving from sound
watershed conservation practices. Developing financing
arrangements that can put in practice the principle
«beneficiary pays» can help not only to preserve water
supply services, but also to contribute to biodi-
versity, climate change, and income generation goals,
particularly for poor, forest dependent people. Ho-
wever, the setting up of institutions governing the
interaction among various stakeholders involved in
watershed management and establishing payment
transfers for providers or sellers of the services face
serious complexities. Under such institutional arrange-
ments, potential transaction costs to organize and
control the payment transfers can be extremely high,
especially when there are multiple, small scale service
providers and users, as it frequently happens in the Me-
diterranean region. In such circumstances clearly
assigning land property rights is one area of institu-
tional innovation to reduce transaction costs, while
building social capital and the use of intermediary
agencies can facilitate the running of equitable and
efficient PWS schemes.
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